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Abstract
Swarm robotics is a relatively new technology that is being explored for its
potential use in a variety of different applications and environments. Previous
emerging technologies have often overlooked security until later developmen-
tal stages, when it has had to be undesirably (and sometimes expensively)
retrofitted. We identify a number of security challenges for swarm robotics
and argue that now is the right time to address these issues and seek solu-
tions. We also identify several idiosyncrasies of swarm robotics that present
some unique security challenges. In particular, swarms of robots potentially
employ different types of communication channels; have special concepts of
identity; and exhibit adaptive emergent behaviour which could be modified
by an intruder. Addressing these issues now will prevent undesirable conse-
quences for many applications of this type of technology.
1 Introduction
Swarm robotics is a relatively young area of research, which is growing rapidly
and comprehensive reviews of the state-of-the-art may be found in [1, 2, 3].
As with many technologies, there is no formal definition for swarm robotics
that engenders universal agreement, however there are some characteristics
that have been generally accepted. These include robot autonomy; decen-
tralised control; large numbers of member robots; collective emergent be-
haviour and local sensing and communication capabilities. From our security
perspective it is reasonable to consider swarm robotics as a special type of
computer network with the aforementioned characteristics.
It has often been the case that the security of a new technology is an af-
terthought rather than an upfront design objective, leading to many security
issues. This was the case with, for example, mobile phone technology. The
first generation of mobile phones were analogue, and easy to clone since they
broadcast their identity clearly over the airwaves. It was also easy to eaves-
drop on them by simply tuning a radio receiver to pick up conversations.
Subsequently the underlying technology had to be expensively modified in
order to address these threats. In the case of swarm robotics research, the
particular security requirements of swarm robotic networks do not appear to
have been investigated in any detail so far. Thus we believe that this is an
opportune time to consider these issues, before any wide-scale deployment.
Deferring security research until later in the technology’s evolution could,
depending on the application, be a risky strategy and lead to undesirable
consequences.
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As far as we are aware, this is the first attempt to categorise security
challenges to swarm robotics. Very little prior work appears to have been
done. A notable exception to this is the work of Winfield and Nembrini
[4] who identify several threats to a swarm of robots, which they classify as
hazards. We hope that our identification of the main security challenges will
result in the development of robot swarm technology that is reliable and safe
to deploy even in potentially hostile environments.
In Section 2 we briefly review technologies that are similar to swarm
robotics, highlighting the key differences. In Section 3 we discuss security,
commencing with a short high level overview of security, providing examples
of swarm robotic deployment where security is required, and then catalogu-
ing aspects of the swarm robotic environment which present challenges to
security. Finally in Section 4 we draw some conclusions.
2 Related Technologies
Before considering the security of swarm robotic networks it will be useful
to review how similar technologies, some of which have been subjected to a
degree of security analysis, relate to robotic swarms. This will allow us to
identify the unique features of robotic swarms that may benefit from closer
scrutiny in terms of security.
2.1 Multi-Robot Systems
Swarm robotics differs from more traditional multi-robot systems in that
their command and control structures are not hierarchical or centralised, but
are fully distributed, self-organised and inspired by the collective behaviour of
social insect colonies and other animal societies [5]. Self-organisation means
that sometimes the collective behaviour, even if unpredictable, may well re-
sult in solutions to problems that are superior to ones that could have been
devised in advance. The parallel drawn with social societies in the animal
world extends to communication interactions between the robots can be
indirect as well as direct. Fault-tolerance, which is related to security, has
already been extensively researched within the context of multi-robot sys-
tems with hierarchical command and control, notably in the work of Parkers
ALLIANCE control architecture [6].
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2.2 Mobile Sensor Networks
Sensor networks consist of collections of devices (or nodes) with sensors that
typically communicate over a wireless network. A mobile sensor network is
a sensor network where the nodes are either placed on objects which move
[7] or where the nodes may move themselves [8]. In the latter case they
are sometimes known as robotic sensor networks.1 Hybrid systems also exist
[9], where mobile robots work in conjunction with static sensors. Although
mobile sensor networks exhibit many similarities to swarm robotic networks,
there are distinct differences. For example, robotic swarms may utilise a
wider range of communications technologies, which extend to indirect com-
munication such as stigmergy. Additionally, individual identity may be more
important in a sensor network if it is important to determine exactly where
some sensed data originated. Furthermore, and importantly, a sensor net-
work is not designed to have the collective emergent behaviour of a robotic
swarm.
2.3 MANETs
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks ( MANETs) consist of wireless mobile nodes that
relay each others traffic, with the nodes spontaneously forming the wireless
network themselves. The special properties of MANETs, such as the lack of
infrastructure, absence of trusted third parties, as well as possible resource
constraints, make implementing security a very challenging task. MANETs
can consists of many types of mobile devices and there is considerable exist-
ing work on their security [10, 11]. Although MANETs do not exhibit the
emergent behaviour of swarms, some MANET security techniques could have
relevance to swarm robotics depending on the communication method used
by the swarm.
2.4 Software Agents
There is no universally agreed definition of a software agent, but we take
one proposed by Wooldridge [12]: An agent is a computer system that is
situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous action in
this environment in order to meet its design objectives. A multi-agent system
(MAS) [13, 12] is a system composed of multiple autonomous agents, where
each agent cannot solve a problem unaided; there is no global system control;
data is decentralised; and computation is asynchronous. A mobile agent is
a particular class of agent with the ability during execution to migrate from
1http://rsn.cs.rpi.edu
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one host to another where it can resume its execution [13]. Thus mobile
multi-agent systems may share many features with swarm robotic systems,
but in a virtual world.
Corresponding to the active interest in mobile software agents and their
rapid adoption, there has been much interest in their security [13]. However
this does not always translate easily to robotic swarms because of the partic-
ular characteristics of robotic swarms which differentiate them, such as their
physical nature, diverse communication mechanisms and control structure.
3 Security of Swarm Robotics
3.1 Basic Security Terminology
Security in any environment, including swarm robotics, is fundamentally
about the provision of core security services, some of the most important
of which are as follows. The service confidentiality is about keeping data
secret. An integrity service prevents prevents data from being altered in an
unauthorised or unintended way. Entity authentication (sometimes called
identification) is the process whereby one entity is assured of the identity
of another entity. Data origin authentication is the assurance that data
came from its reputed source. Finally, availability is the property of being
accessible and useable upon demand by an authorised entity. The term denial
of service is often used in reference to loss of availability.
A threat is a potential violation of the provision of a desired security
service. Threats that are not mitigated leave vulnerabilities in the system
that may be exploited. Such exploitative actions are often called attacks and
those that initiate their execution are attackers. An example of a threat
could be that an unauthorized person might see top secret information; a
vulnerability could be that trust is misplaced in a courier; an attack could be
that someone steals the data and publishes it in the media. Information may
also be accidentally lost. The impact of a document theft or loss will depend
on the content of the document. The process of risk assessment takes this
into consideration along with the probability of the threat being realised.
In any system, the provision of security is a holistic process. This requires
careful management processes that oversee the use of specific security tech-
nologies that can be applied to devices and networks. These include firewalls,
access control mechanisms and network security protocols. At the heart of
most security technologies is the deployment of specific cryptographic prim-
itives, which are mathematical tools that can be applied to data to provide
the core security services. These normally rely on the careful protection and
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maintenance of cryptographic keys, which are critical data items that must
be stored securely.
3.2 Scenarios Demonstrating the Need for Security in
Swarm Robotic Applications
Military:
Swarm robotic networks may be used in military applications2 where the
need for security is perhaps self evident. However, circumstances may arise in
non-military applications where the system may be vulnerable to particular
threats.
Environment: Robot swarms may be used to maintain the environ-
ment by detecting environmental pollutants such as oil spillages and cleaning
them up [14]. Although exchanged data may not be sensitive in such appli-
cations, data integrity and availability are of high importance. Furthermore,
the swarm may accidentally encounter a ’rogue’ device perhaps from a swarm
with a different goal. Unless the ’intruder’ is detected the emergent behaviour
of the swarm may be affected. In the military scenario, of course, the rogue
may indeed be malicious.
Disaster Relief: Robot swarms could be deployed during disaster relief
operations in environments where traditional communication networks have
broken down.3 Availability then becomes a primary security requirement, as
well as authentication/identification in the case where multiple swarms are
in joint operation.
Healthcare: The European I-Ward project uses swarms of robots to
provide assistance to healthcare workers.4 Entity authentication is likely to
be the most important security requirement in such scenarios. Moreover, au-
thentication and confidentiality may be important when robots are deployed
in multiple applications, to prevent data from previous application sessions
being disclosed.
Commercial Applications: As the technology develops robotic swarms
may find commercial use. In any commercial application the motivation to
steal data and services will lead to threats to the service. If commercial ap-
plications are to be successfully deployed then some consideration should be
given beforehand to the potential security risks.
2http://www.challenge.mod.uk/
3http://www.shu.ac.uk/mmvl/research/guardians/
4http://www.iward.eu/cms/index.php
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3.3 Challenges to Security
It is appropriate therefore to consider the challenges to providing security in
swarm robotic networks. It is clear that some security issues are similar to
other related technologies and that some solutions from these technologies
may apply to swarm robotics. However, not all of these shared problems have
been fully solved. Furthermore, the swarm robotic environment introduces
particular security challenges that do not exist in other technologies.
Resource Constraints: The smaller a device is, the greater the chal-
lenge to providing security due to resource constraints (storage, communi-
cation bandwidth, computational restrictions and most importantly energy).
Attacks on the provision of resources can lead to the device becoming inoper-
able, permanently so if the resource is not renewable. This leads to a loss of
availability. Resource constraints also restrict the types of existing security
technologies that can be deployed.
Physical Capture and Tampering: Physical capture of a robot leads
to loss of availability. Worse, capture of security credentials could harm other
members of the swarm. If a robot is tampered with and reintroduced into
the swarm, an attacker might influence the swarm behaviour. This attack
would be unique to swarm robotic technology.
Control: Systems employing swarm intelligence do not have a hierarchi-
cal structure with points of control. The individuals within these systems
take decisions autonomously, based on local sensing and communications.
With such systems it is evident that there could be many risks if they went
out-of-control, including many security violations such as loss of confiden-
tiality or availability. Control presents an interesting challenge to security
within swarm robotics.
Communication: Swarm robots can interact either explicitly, or implic-
itly [15]. Explicit communication can be achieved via broadcast or directed
messages. Radio-frequency (RF) and infra-red (IR) technologies have been
widely for explicit communications within swarms. Other technologies in-
clude coloured LED display, body-language or sign-language, colour patterns
on a robots body, coil induction, haptics, audible sounding, combination of
LED display and audio signalling and acoustic signalling in an underwater
environment. Implicit communication includes interaction via sensing other
robots and their behaviours, and interaction via the environment, which acts
as a sort of shared memory and is known as stigmergy [16, 5, 17].
From a security perspective, any open implicit or explicit communication
method can be jammed, intercepted or otherwise disturbed relatively easily
by an attacker. The security of RF and IR has been well researched but
the security of the remaining more exotic interaction methods needs to be
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thoroughly investigated and presents a fascinating security challenge.
Swarm Mobility: Security is difficult to provide in any mobile environ-
ment, however the mobility of robot swarms is quite unusual and has some
interesting characteristics that might make some security services easier to
implement than for related technologies. One example is entity authentica-
tion, discussed below, which could be provided through visual sensing and
physical data exchange. However any constraint on the movement of swarm
members, for example to remain in the bounds of the swarm could present
additional security issues.
Identity and Authentication: As discussed in section 3.2, it may be
very important for a swarm robot to determine if it is interacting with a
legitimate entity or not. Data origin and entity authentication require some
notion of identity, which is a particular problem where individual identity
within a swarm is undesirable [18]. Other work has used group identity [19];
or individual identity which is broadcast regularly [20]. If identity can be
assumed or changed then attacks can be launched on entity authentication,
confidentiality, integrity and availability. The notion of identity within a
robotic swarm thus presents an interesting challenge from a security stand-
point.
Key Management: Security services deployed in a robot swarm in-
evitably require the need to manage cryptographic keys [21]. These keys de-
fine which pairs (or groups) of robots can apply security services. As robots
join and leave a swarm, it may be necessary to alter this keying material.
Thus the dynamic and interactive nature of a swarm presents sophisticated
key management challenges.
Intrusion Detection: When a foreign entity joins a network it is some-
times called intrusion. One means of detecting intrusion is based on network
Intrusion Detection Systems. The autonomous nature of robots and collec-
tive emergent nature of the behaviour of the swarm will make any anomalous
behaviour difficult to detect. If undetected, one or more foreign robots could
infiltrate the swarm, either maliciously or accidentally, and ultimately affect
the desired emergent behaviour.
Once an intruder is detected, an appropriate response will need to be
formulated according to an Intrusion Protection System. Depending on the
application the response could be to simply ignore the rogue device, or to
monitor its behaviour, or to find a way to either disable it or remove it from
the system. Intrusion detection and protection looks to be particularly chal-
lenging in a swarm of robots, and will need a specifically tailored approach.
Managing Learning: Robots can learn and react to environmental
changes by means of adaption. A malicious entity might present changes
in the environment which will cause a robot to adapt in an undesired way.
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For example, if anomaly detection is used to detect intrusion based on learn-
ing typical behaviour, then a malicious entity could change the pattern of
typical behaviour in order to gain entry to the network.
4 Conclusions
The development of swarm robotic technology has reached a point where
many new applications are emerging. Therefore, we believe that this is an
opportune moment to take a closer look at the security of swarm robotic
systems - before widespread deployment. Although the security of related
technology has been investigated, robotic swarms are different due to fac-
tors such as their autonomy, distributed control, and emergent behaviour.
Bearing this in mind, we have identified a number of significant challenges
to robotic swarm security, some of which are unique to this technology. For
example, the challenges presented by more esoteric communication methods
than straightforward RF or IR, the question of identity, and the potential for
modification of emergent behaviour if a malicious entity manages to infiltrate
the swarm. It is likely that some of these challenges will require new security
techniques to be developed, and we will aim to investigate these in our future
work.
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